| Caution: This blog is la-halakhah ve-lo le-ma'aseh. Consult your rabbi before following any practices advocated here. Disclaimer: In reviewing books, I may choose works in which I have a financial interest. I believe that I will still be able to maintain objectivity but judge for yourselves. Important Policy: This blog is intended only for the interchange of ideas for the purpose of Torah study, promoting enlightened public policy and/or the refinement of character. Comments in that spirit are welcome but those that entail denigration of character are not welcome and if they appear will be deleted upon discovery. Since editing is rarely feasible, comments that are deemed inappropriate will be deleted entirely or, if possible, edited. Comments Moderation: For questions and suggestions about comments, please contact the blog's general editor Rabbi Ari Enkin at this e-mail address. Advertisement Policy: Please note that this blog does not necessarily endorse the services of advertisers. Please consider carefully any books and events announced on this blog and decide on your own whether they are appropriate for you. |
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Books Received XII
I don't always have the chance to review each book, so I'll list the books that I receive. Some of them will be quoted or reviewed in future posts. Here are the books I've received recently:- Aspects of Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik's Philosophy of Judaism: An Analytic Approach by R. Dr. Shubert Spero
- Jewish Values In A Changing World by R. Yehuda Amital
- Judaism: A Way of Being by David Hillel Gelernter
Hagiographers and the Rambam
R. Yair Hoffman writes in his daily VinDaf on the VosIzNeias website (link):A recent controversy in the pages of Hakirah – the Flatbush Journal of Jewish Law and Thought dealt with (Summer, 2009 p.20) dealt with an accusation of the Brisker method being “ahistorical.”Read the full article here: link. See these related posts: I, II.
The Brisker method is often characterized as examining the particulars of a given halacha and finding two or more elements in them that work upon differing principles. The method often questions whether the particular obligation under discussion is one that is incumbent upon the item itself “Cheftza” or the person performing the Mitzvah “Gavra.” Classically, the Brisker methodology utilizes the method to resolve a difficult Rambam, but occasionally it is used to shed light upon a Tosfos or another Rishon as well.
E-Shiur Reminder
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Just a reminder that my e-shiur through Torah in Motion begins tonight at 9pm EST. The series is called "Recent Books You Should Care About".Tonight we will discuss the changing styles of writing halakhah and you will learn about my favorite books on Hilkhos Shabbos, Niddah Harchakos, Tzedakah, Chessed and more.
Registration is free but required: link
Weekly Links
Rules: link (Note that this post will move every day until the end of the week)Tuesday
- SALT today: link
- JPost letter from gay Jew to the Modern Orthodox: link
- Madoff effects to be auctioned off: link
- Public-private philanthropy: link
- Double life of converts in Israel: link
- Letting fathers do their thing: link
- Why some kids go "Off the Derech": link
Monday
Birkat Hamazon: Preliminary Tehillim
By: Rabbi Ari EnkinIt is customary recite a preliminary chapter of Tehillim before reciting the birkat hamazon after meals. On weekdays, the general custom is to recite chapter 137, "Al Naharot Bavel", which is intended to remind us of the destruction of Jerusalem and the current exile.[1] The Zohar states that one who derives pleasure from bread and enjoys the taste of foods is required to remember the Holy Land and the Beit Hamikdash after every meal.[2] On Shabbat, and other festive days when such sobering thoughts are not appropriate, chapter 126, "Shir Hama'alot", is recited instead which speaks about the future redemption.[3] Some also recite "Shir Hama'alot" when in the presence of a special guest.[4] These Tehillim should be recited before washing one's hands at the end of the meal ("mayim achronim").[5]
Click here to read moreIt is recorded that there were great rabbis who had the practice to recite "Shir Hama'alot" every single day of the year before reciting birkat hamazon. [6] The only exception to this was on Erev Tisha B'av, when they too would recite the "Al Naharot Bavel" in order to better prepare themselves emotionally for the onset of Tisha B'av. It seems that that this was also the custom of the Baal Shem Tov, the Arizal, and other kabbalists. The reason for the custom to always substitute "Al Naharot Bavel" with "Shir Hama'alot" was in order to be "b'simcha", to be happy whenever possible, and reciting "Al Naharot Bavel" can't help but make one sad.[7] Many Sefardim and Chassidim also recite "Lamnatze'ach" and other preliminary readings before the birkat hamazon. Reciting a chapter of Tehillim before the birkat hamazon also allows one to fulfill the requirement that every meal include words of Torah.
Based on the teachings of the Arizal, some individuals also have the custom of reciting additional Scriptural verses prior to reciting the birkat hamazon, most notably: "Tehillat Hashem", "Hodu L'hashem", and "Mi Yemalel", among others.[8] The origin for reciting these verses is unclear. There is reason to suggest, however, that these verses were regarded as a segula, that one should always have food to eat. As such, it is especially appropriate to recite them during one's meal or as part of the birkat hamazon in the hopes that one will never go hungry.[9] It is also suggested that these supplementary verses were chosen because they parallel the themes of the blessings of the birkat hamazon.[10] Those who recite these additional verses should do so after having washed mayim achromin.[11] One should also take a few moments before birkat hamazon to contemplate the great mitzva which one is about to perform. [12]
***********************************************
[1] Mishna Berura 1:11
[2] Rite and Reason p.193
[3] Magen Avraham O.C. 1:5, Aruch Hashulchan O.C. 181:9
[4] Rite and Reasom p.199 note 18
[5] Aruch Hashulchan 181:9
[6] Piskei Teshuvot 182:note 60
[7] Minhag Yisrael Torah 1:3
[8] Kaf Hachaim O.C. 157:22 (they are from Tehillim 145:21, 115:18, 107:1, 106:2)
[9] Otzar Hatefillot siddur (Ashkenaz, vol. 1 p. 474), cited by Rabbi Gil Student at: http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2005/09/tehillas-hashem.html
[10] Rite and Reason p.140
[11] Kaf Hachaim O.C. 157:22
[12] Kaf Hachaim O.C. 183:46
Monday, November 09, 2009
New Periodical: Kol Hamevaser 3:2
There is a new issue of Kol Hamevaser: The Jewish Thought Magazine of the Yeshiva University Student Body on the topic of "Family and Community." The whole issue is available here: link. Also, those who would like to subscribe to automatically receive a PDF version of new editions of the paper should send an e-mail to kolhamevaser@gmail.com.
- The Modern Orthodox Response to Orthopraxy by Eli Putterman
- Prayer: A Call for Philosophical Inquiry by Sarit Bendavid
- Rabbinic Leadership Reexamined by Alex Luxenberg
- On the Virtue of Followership: Ein Melekh be-Lo Am by Noah Cheses"Am le-Badad Yishkon:" Must the Singular Nation Always Reside Alone? by Nicole Grubner
- An Interview with Rabbi Yaakov Neuberger by Staff
- Be Not Overly Modest: Tseni'ut and the Inability to Speak About Sex by Emmanuel Sanders
- An Interview with Mrs. Shani Taragin: Part One by Staff
- Shemirat Negi'ah and Reality by Nathaniel Jaret
- Reality Check: Lo Tikrevu le-Gallot Ervah and Shemirat Negi'ah by Shaul Seidler-Feller
- Musar's Incomplete Victory by Rabbi Yosef Blau
- "A Yid iz Geglaychn tzu a Seyfer Toyre" by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik
- Don't Read This Essay by Reuven Rand
- Beginning the Conversation: A Review of Rabbi Jonathan Sacks' Weekly Readings of Be-Reshit by Shlomo Zuckier
Sunday, November 08, 2009
This May Or May Not Be My God
A friend of mine told me that he remembers when a ba'al teshuvah (new to observance) yeshiva in the 1970's removed its copy of Herman Wouk's This Is My God from its library because the book said that it is acceptable not to believe in God. Now, considering that the book is a classic of the outreach literature that brought countless Jews back to their religion, I found it hard to believe. My friend's memory must be faulty.
I looked closely at the book and in the Epilogue to the original 1959 book (it has since been expanded twice -- in 1969 and 1987) it does say that one can choose whether or not to believe in God. Here is an excerpt that shows his clear lack of assertion that he has the absolute truth (p. 249):
Click here to read more
Though I have lived my life as an observant Jew, I have never been able to pretend to religious certainties. I have found it impossible to join in cheerleading condemnations of Reform, Conservatism, and irreligious Zionism; and for all my too-frequent public speaking, I have never denounced the assimilators.This is a passage that makes me squirm. I'm just not too sure how ingenuous it actually is. The entire book passionately and eloquently advocates an Orthodox point of view, even if being polite to the non-Orthodox movements.
Wouk's next step in his Epilogue is to apply his uncertainty to the existence of God. However, I think that reading this superficially is a profound misunderstanding of Wouk's point. He was writing in a time of American belief in "progress" -- the salvation of the world through science and scholarship. Marxism was still considered a highly successful and idealistic ideology.
Wouk began his discussion by lauding the thinking questioner who at least struggles with belief in God. One should not be too certain in the forces of "progress." He then proceeds to explain that there is no way to prove or disprove God's existence. This was remarkable in that he allowed room for belief in God, something that few popular intellectuals of that time would.
Wouk was urging readers to move beyond the unthinking naturalism that was popular in his time and the atheistic Existentialism that was rising in prominence (think Sartre), and instead embrace an Existential approach that allows for personal choices on matters of profound meaning. Since he could not prove God's existence, he instead discussed a person's options (p. 257):
The paradox of existence stands. Take one side of it, and go on your way with the chance-nature dogmas. Take the other side of it and -- if you are a Jew -- you will probably find the Lawgiver waiting for you. He will meet you with the smile and the embrace of my grandfather. "What kept you so long?" he will say. And you will sit down to study the Torah together.I understand why this would irk outreach rabbis who believe that they can prove God's existence. However, to those more in touch with contemporary intellectual discussion -- certainly in the 1960's and 1970's -- those proofs rang hollow. Wouk instead offered Orthodox Judaism as a compelling religious approach and left it up to the reader to choose to believe in God.
Friday, November 06, 2009
Weekly Links
Rules: link (Note that this post will move every day until the end of the week)FridayPrevious days' linksThursday
- SALT today: link
- Jewish Press interview with Governor Paterson: link
- Bamba wins Kosherfest prize: link
- Lord Jonathan Sacks: link
- Jonathan Rosenblum on the Shidduch Crisis: link
- Swiss debate controversial law restricting the building of mosque minarets: link
- SALT today: link
- ATID podcast about Koren-Sacks siddur with R. Jeffrey Saks and Dr. Yoel Finkelman: link
- Controversy over the Toldos Avraham Yizchak Rebbe in Lawrence: link 1, link 2
Thursday, November 05, 2009
Audio Roundup LXVI
by Joel Rich[Mazal tov to Joel on the birth of twin grandchildren -Gil]
Question: You attend a minyan which begins prior to the earliest time for talit/tfillin (T/T). The morah datra has outlined 2 procedures that may be followed and is indifferent to which one any individual chooses. Daven with the tzibbur and 1) put on T/T before beginning to daven, at the earliest time for T/T (which will be before Yishtabach is reached), say the appropriate brachot as you rewrap the talit and move the tfillin or 2) wait until the earliest time for T/T and then put them on with the appropriate brachot but the tzibbur will continue to daven as soon as enough time has elapsed for procedure 1 but not 2.
Which would you choose and why? What if doing 2) meant you would be putting them on during Yishtabach/Barchu (or waiting till after; and what if that caused you to not say shma with the tzibbur)?
Click here to read more
Very thought provoking shiur from 1993 (warning – includes references to secular law systems and philosophy).
Law reflects and impacts society and history. Crisis situations test law’s ability to be both a stabilizing and creative force. If a system is primarily pragmatic, it is easier to adjust (think U.S./mixed race marriages) than one which is philosophically based (e.g. halacha which is immutable and all encompassing). Even Choshen mishpat represents ideal (although note there were two sources of authority – beit din and melech).
Halacha is not only representative of an ideal but has a function of tikkun olam in an imperfect world.
Halacha intercts with society in a number of ways:
* Conflicting “goods” within halacha may require “painful” halachic compromise (e.g. compromises for kiruv).
* Uncharted territory (e.g. genetic engineering) How much practical information does a posek need? Need to be keen observer of society (but not of it? More on this later)
* Reappraisals motivated by new circumstance (could be more or less stringent).
* Circumventions (e.g. pruzbol, mechirat chametz) which must be in absolute compliance with halacha and caused by historical urgency (me – yes, I know, as defined by who??).
We’ve lost flexibility due to no beit din hagadol, internal conflicts and the fragmentation of authority.
Lots of interesting discussion of halachic process and flexibility which IMVHO boil down to “whom do you trust”.
The job of the posek is to uncover theoretical roots of halacha to apply it (R’Micha – sounds like trying to unpack an algorithm to me!), therefore budding poskim need to focus on intellectual learning, not psak.
In eras of laxity of practice, it is understandable that there’s less sympathy to specific cases and more to perceptions of the masses in the face of a system perceived to be under attack by societal forces. He feels this is often subconscious (me – hard for me to believe such smart people aren’t at all self aware).
This self awareness issue plays out elsewhere in R’MR’s thought “if societal influences are assimilated unconsciously by baalei halacha whose essential persona has been primarily shaped by the corpus of torah - - - - then no danger to halacha”. IMHO it sounded like he was trying to thread the needle between 1) anyone with any exposure to “outside world” has non-torah influences (unconscious?) and thus is pasul and 2) you need to be completely of the “world” to judge the world (not in an ivory tower)… In R’MR’s opinion, he wasn’t trying to thread the needle, just defining reality.
Ramat Bet Shemesh (Mitch, is that where you live?) has non Chasidim putting on Rabbeinu Tam tfillin. Northern N.J. has citizens returning from Israel on last day of Yom Tov in N.A., and some of them return home from airport before that day is over!? CLOR!!
Shabbat elevator discussion (BTW, I think getting in the elevator and the Non ben brit operator taking you to your known floor is rmizah l’akum not amira); in an event R’HS says you can’t do this on an ongoing basis.
Review of 2 source gemaras on Yuhara (showing off religiously?)
Interesting insight as to what the chatan is worried about on his wedding evening.
Bottom line – being different can sometimes be a problem and is very much a function of community standards (me – and of the community’s perception of the level of the individual).
Mashiv haruach. When can you assume you said it? One month (per Tur – me - assumedly based on something inherent in the creation or a sociological observation – you tell me). Machloket to whether if you say it that number of times quickly does it count? Can you extrapolate number and time period from the law of the goring ox? What about other cases (e.g. chazakah)? How does the GRA’s “bein dan ldam” (3 differing arenas money, impurity, Issur) impact extraporatability (my new word)?
Bottom line (to me) is this a “theory of everything” issue or a local one? Interesting insight from R’YBS on why “chazakah” somethings 2 sometimes 3 (pattern recognition or requires “chalot”).
Talk about 70 sparks! Compare this shiur to R’Sobolofsky’s review in #64. Possible exceptions to the “no captions” approach outlined and the “worldviews” of the Rambam and Rashba (not necessarily what you would have expected) outlined – is Shabbat “kulo tora” or about using time wisely (a subject near and dear to my heart)?
L’Shitato halacha is not about “magic” but about svara (logic). When science determines a fact, halacha recognizes it.
Regarding DNA – there are 3 levels of simanim (signs), DNA would be in the highest level (muvhak) and recognized for Agunah and monetary cases.
His walk off statement could use some clarification (if anyone knows anyone in his shiur, please ask) – by inheritance it sounded like he was saying “Yesh Lvarer” parentage if DNA test is cheap and easy (well actually if you did one, it would be dispositive)???
A detailed analysis of differing approaches to understanding the odicy, including yissurin shel ahava and nisyonot (why are we sometimes tested).
Me – Solution algorithm – pick an approach that best gets you through the night and minimize inconvenient Talmudic sources (or whistle a happy tune!)
A quick review of the R’MF tshuva on chalav hacompanies (not stam!) and the anan sahadei (we testify) of inspection making it “equivalent” of chalav yisrael (me – except on some metaphysical basis?). The government inspection is even better now.
Rabbi David Bistricer-Reputation Preservation: Kashrus and Maris Ayin
A quick review of using parve products that resemble dairy. Common usage seems to make it permissible [me – does this mean common usage in the “outside” world? If inside, who was the first to use it without clearly marking its pareve status? Was he/she an avaryan?]
Is there a need? Does Rapoeh Yerapeh include permission for this?
A (Hebrew) review of the differing undetstandings of the sin involved in harigat ubar (abortion). Some pretty interesting thoughts on a tzaddik being able to raise the dead.
1st in a series on torah and technology. This to be continued shiur, begins with a basic analysis of the prohibition of bishul (cooking) and the technology of self cooking meals (as R’MR said – you need to understand the underlying lomdut to paskin new shailot).
Prophets needed personal relationship experiences to understand the relationship between HKB”H and Klal Yisrael. It doesn’t always work (e.g. Eliyahu). 1st in a series.
Talmudic sources of different types of onaat dvarim – some specifics and exceptions (to be continued).
Review of the various theories underlying the “law of the land” and the practical impact of these theories on halacha.
This week R’Herzog. Sh”ut include the proper name of Tel Aviv – Yafo and the status of the wives of those killed (HY”D) in 1948 in the Etzion block.
www.meirtv.co.il/sitel is the website of machon meir. Here a shiur (with simultaneous translation – a good way to learn Hebrew) on lessons of the tragedies of breishit and noach. General warning against jealousy, outside influences and the like. Specific internet advice – it can be plus or minus.
First in a series. Academics debate: majority – prayer preexisted formal structure created in Yavneh; minority – nope, we’re just replacing sacrifices [prayer as a consolation prize vs. fundamental relationship (me – Rambam vs. Ramban and R’Chaim’s proof – can you imagine Jews ever not praying?)]
Talmudic (ahistorical) sources are there (e.g. Mamadot, Cohain gadol on Yom Kippur). Ben Sira contains at least a precursor if not actual prayer.
Is hiddur mitzvah (beautification of the mitzvah) a torah or rabbinic requirement? We see examples where it pertains to the object (cheftza) and others where it applies to the person (gavra). Perhaps the lesson is while the object may be beautified, the aspiration is for the person to radiate with the beauty of the mitzava and the mitzaveh (commander).
Covers much of the usual territory including source and level of mitzvah, minimum, maximum, priorities and his understanding that aniyei ircha (the poor of your city) priority really means degree of connection you feel.
Genetics – reminded me of my understanding of “Ein mazal l’yisrael” – DNA (and many other factors) may cause a predisposition but is not dispositive.
Major theme – be sensitive and inclusive as a society to all. (Me – what level of cost would society accept to allow for this)
Focus on halachic approaches to dealing with pru u’rvu and ovulation close to, but not quite within, the normally acceptable time frame.
Halacha First
Many Orthodox rabbis today are discussing the roles available for women within Orthodox Judaism. Below is a letter sent by R. Michael J. Broyde to a private RCA discussion list with his thoughts on how the discussion should proceed, posted with his permission. The comments reflect his personal views and not those of this blog or any organization with which he is or has been affiliated.Rabbi Michael J. Broyde is a law professor at Emory University, Chaver of the Beth Din of America and was the Founding Rabbi of the Young Israel in Atlanta.
Click here to read more
Folks,
There have been many posts over the last few weeks touching on issues related to feminism and halacha, and the more general question of changing traditional Orthodox practices to appear to be more welcoming to some women. It is that issue that I wish to discuss in this post, albeit from a perspective that I think has not been well-fleshed out by other posts, which is from a halachic perspective.
Please excuse the length of this post. As with all of my posts on the RCA listserv, please note that I am speaking for no organization that I am or was involved in, neither Emory that employs me, nor the Young Israel that I was the founding rabbi of, nor the Beth Din of America that entitles me a chaver. Also, I hope you will excuse any typos and the like; as many of you know, my wife is sitting shiva for her mother and thus I have been distracted by many other obligations and responsibilities. Comments and corrections are welcome.
It seems to me that from a halachic perspective there are five distinctly different categories related to women and mitzvot: mitzvot that women are obligated in (but no longer do); mitzvot that women are exempt from; mitzvot “neutral”; mitzvot that women are discouraged from; and mitzvot that women are forbidden from doing. Each of these requires a different response.
The first category is situations where women are seeking to do mitzvot that they are normatively considered obligated in, but which our community has developed a practice that women do not do. Because of the modern developments of feminism, women now seek to do these mitzvot. There are many examples of such, including the near wholesale recent insistence that women daven shacharit every day (a practice more or less unheard of a century ago in Europe, where only righteous elderly women davened shacharit), to women’s zimun, to women fasting, to many other types of mitzvot. There is no doubt that much of what motivates some women in these areas is the sincere strive for equality. It seems to me as a matter of halacha that our job in the rabbinate is to encourage people to do mitzvot and to raise the standard level of observance. Even if people start out lacking sincerity, we have a well recognized rule that mitzvot observance sometimes starts insincere and then becomes sincere. This should be the rule we use when we encounter and encourage people (men or women) who wish to undertake the observance of a mitzvah that is obligatory for them to do (or whose lack of observance can only be explained by a dochak halachic reason).
The second case is a situation where a women wishes to do a mitzvah that she is clearly exempt from, but which, if she does, is a mitzvah for her to do, such as sitting in a sukkah or shaking a lulav. Certainly, according to minhag ashkenaz we view such activity as religiously proper and a maaseh mitzvah and as a general matter ought to be encouraged also, even when the motives of the person seeking to do the mitzvah are insincere. This is even more so true when our custom encouraged women to do these mitzvot, and I think is generally true in the abstract. Except for donning tefillin (where there is a serious halachic case discouraging such a practice), it ought to be the job of the rabbinate not to discourage the performance of mitzvot, even when the motives of the do-er of mitzvot are insincere. It seems to me that the conclusion of this category is similar to that of the first category.
The next case is when the conduct is mitzvah neutral, but yet causes a sense of heightened religious experience (subjectively perceived) by the do-er. An example of this might be dancing with a Torah on Simchat Torah or putting the name of one’s mother on a ketubah. Here, exactly because no mitzvah is being done, it seems to me that there is a greater need for a subjective examination of both the motives of the asker and the context of the community. There is no reason to label this conduct as assur, but there is also no objective halachic reason to encourage this conduct either. Subjective norms of community play a significant role in this activity exactly because halachic values are not at play.
The final two categories are different and I will not address them here in detail: they are cases where women seek to engage in activity that halacha either generally discourages or flatly prohibits. In such cases, certainly motives outside the confines of halacha make such conduct even more discourage-able. Addressing how to respond to sin, whether it is sin with good motives or sin with bad motives, is beyond what I want to discuss now. Sometimes how one responds to sin determines whether the sinner stays within the community or not and is quite literally dinei nefashot and very important. But it is not my topic now. Of course, good motives generate a different response to sin than bad motives, but such is beyond my topic now.[1]
So, it seems to me that from a halachic view we really have three basic categories: mitzvot, halachically neutral, and violations.
First, there are those things that are mitzvot: activity that Jewish law thinks is to be encouraged and is positive. In my view, absent rare and extenuating situations, it is job of the rabbinate to encourage people (even people with bad motives) to engage in mitzvot.
Second, there is conduct that is halachically neutral, but which some people think brings them closer to God and Torah. This type of conduct is only to be encouraged when the person answering the question thinks that such conduct really does accomplish its task, both for this person and for the community as a whole.
Finally, there is that conduct which violates Jewish law, which we are to seek to encourage people not to do. The issues of how and why and when we do so has to be tempered by our love of every Jewish sinner and our desire to remove sin, but not always the sinner, from our community.
As a side, allow me to use the contrast between these three basic categories of mitzvah, neutral and assur to serve as an explanation, in my view, of the views of Rav Soloveitchik. Some have wondered how the Rav, zt”l, could take such a firm stance against women being the president of a shul, a less firm but yet clear stance against women dancing with a Torah on Simchat Torah and yet take such a clear and firm stance in favor of women learning Gemara: Was the Rav a feminist (as some suggest based on his view of women learning Gemara) or a misogynist (as some have proposed in light of his stance on women as shul presidents?) I would suggest that the contrast between these three categories explains the difference. When (and if) women’s learning Torah she-bal peh is not assur, then it is either a mandatory mitzvah (in some subjects, like hilchot Shabbat) or a permissive mitzvah (similar to women taking a lulav). Since learning Torah for women was, in the Rav’s view, almost always a mitzvah (why the Rav felt this way is not is for now, but he clearly did), not only would he not discourage it, but he sought to always encourage it, exactly because motives do not matter when people are going to perform mitzvot. Dancing with a Torah was not a mitzvah and thus was to be discouraged when motives were not sincere. Since a woman being a shul president was, in the Rav’s view a technical violation of serarah issues, no matter what the motives, it was to be discouraged. The mitzvah, reshut or issur calculus thus explains the Rav’s views.[2]
Why is this form of categorization important? The answer is obvious to me. The first step in deciding the answer to any given question about women and halacha is not deciding the motives of the person asking it, but rather what really is the halacha. After one determines the answer to that crucial question, then and only then do motives play a role.
Let me give you a few examples to reflect on, all focusing on women’s issues. When a woman asks about whether she should light her own menorah or be yotzei with her husband, the first question a rabbi needs to ask himself is the most important: What is the base-line halacha? Is it better for a woman to light her own menorah or not? He will readily discover that this is a dispute between contemporary poskim which he will have to resolve. After he resolves this crucial and central question, which goes to the heart of the question of whether this conduct is a mitzvah or neutral or even an averah, will he be able to consider the question of why the woman might be asking this question. How important motives are is extremely important, in my view, when the conduct is not a mitzvah in and of itself.
The same is true for the question of women’s zimun and for the question of whether to put the mothers name in a ketubah. The first question has to be halachic. Is this a mitzvah, mutar or assur as a matter of Jewish law? Only after determining if this mutar can one have a real conversation about whether such conduct is wise or proper and whether we ought to change our minhag in situations where we question the motives of those who seek such change.
The same can be said about women’s aliyot. The central question should not be whether this conduct is wise or astute public policy or even a violation of minhag yisrael. Our first question should be a technical one: No matter what the motives of the questioner are, is this conduct a mitzvah, mutar or assur? The same methodology has to be true for answering questions of women dancing with a Torah, or circling for hakafot or reading megillah or serving as shochatim or learning Gemara or being a mohel or any other question.
Only after we discuss the base-line halacha for every matter can other factors come into play, such as “minhag yisrael din hu,” balanced against the ever changing needs of a society, as well as our desire to have Orthodoxy both be and appear to be fair and just, and the specific needs of this questioner, as well as many other factors. Of course, this approach inclines us to be more sympathetic to the desire of people to do mitzvot than non-mitzvot (and certainly, averot), but I suspect that this is a deep halachic value for obvious reasons.
Indeed, this same approach, in my view, needs to be asked virtually every time a person comes in to ask a shayla generally. It is a poor reflection on the rabbinate when questions of policy come before questions of halacha. Our congregants and community lose faith in halacha as our legal system when questions of motive seem to trump questions of mutar or assur.
Three concluding thoughts:
First, Nodah beYehuda observes (correctly in my view) in OC 2:18 that when there is a clear minhag yisrael to do something (in this case, to have 12 windows in a shul), but that minhag is an obstacle to serious religious growth, then if the minhag is not grounded in halacha, we ought to abandon the minhag in that particular case. Most of us think that the Noda beYehuda’s formulation is correct, and if that is true, then all arguments of minhag without any serious reference to halacha will not really persuade anyone who is not already persuaded. They will always respond in reference to the Nodah beYehuda: non-halachic minhagim need to change as the reality of life changes. To really persuade someone, we need to speak the language of halacha first and foremost.
Second, some of you will certainly be critical of the post as understating the importance of "minhag yisrael din hu," and this is worthy of a reply. Minhag comes in at least two forms. The first, which is the subject of the phrase "minhag yisrael din hu," is a reference to those cases where minhag serves as tool for resolving halachic disputes in the Talmud or the Rishonim. That, too, has a place in this conversation as a form of hachra’ah of which we need to be mindful. But, when minhag serves to encourage or discourage conduct without any textual halachic foundation (such as having 12 windows in a shul) it is a different kind of minhag and it has to serve a role independent of, and after, the halachic calculus.
Let me give you an example in a halachic area related to women: women saying kiddush. Shulchan Aruch gives us the rule in OC 271:2 that women are fully obligated in kiddush, as men are, and can fulfill the obligation for men. Bach and Yam Shel Shlomo argue and posit that kiddush is like megillah and women cannot fulfill the obligation for men. What should we do? Mishnah Berurah (271:4) notes that the halacha follows the Mechaber as the "Taz, Magen Avraham, Gra and other Achronim agree with him," but yet he adds after his discussion of the classical halachic sources has ended that "the custom is lechatchila not to allow women to make kiddush for people outside her household because of zeluta milta." The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 271:5) reaches a different conclusion[3] and permits women to make kiddush for anyone, but he follows the same methodology: First, an unvarnished assessment of the halacha and then an analysis of the social implications of whether we should actually permit that which is mutar to be widely done. Let me add that the Mishnah Berurah could have said "one should be strict for the view of the Bach" which would have been a totally different hachra’ah as a matter of halacha than to note zeluta milta on the issue. He does not because one should not (let me say more, "dare not for the sake of halachic integrity") mix the question of “what is the halacha?” with “what is a wise policy?”. Mishnah Berurah knows this, Aruch Hashulchan knows this and so should we.
Finally, some will read this post as a plea to permit more than we do, and some will read this as a plea to prohibit more than we do. Neither of these reads is correct. This email is about halachic process; results will follow from halachic process by focusing on what is a mitzvah, what is mutar and what is assur. If we as the Orthodox Rabbinate do not stand up for the authenticity of halachic process, no one else will; if we get into the bad habit of not opening every presentation of a complex topic with a genuine, honest and fair conversation about the halachic sources with no bias, no one else will. As a community, we will be sunk if that happens.
We have to be a halachic community before we can be a traditional community.
Michael Broyde
[1] Let me give you an example unrelated to women. Recently, I entered the hospital room of a dying person who was intensely davening shacharit (he was in the middle of birchot keriat shema when I arrived) but the time of the day was after chatzot. This conduct was sinful, but I chose not to say anything, even when he asked me if he was doing something wrong, in the view that a sincere person like this can maybe rely the view of the Rambam that birchot keriat shema can be said all day, as the Peri Chadash accepts le’halacha, or maybe simply this was not the time and place to explain the issue.
[2] Igrot Moshe OC 4:49 sv ibra d’ika contains a formulation that could be read to the contrary of this formulation, but I do not think that read is correct. Rav Moshe in this paragraph is following his well established view that mitzvot done by kofrim (however defined) are of no value and get no Heavenly reward at all. For that reason he invokes the work kefirah in the final sentence. He is not referring to a women or man who does mitzvot in the generic shelo lishma mode (but who is clearly not a heretic). See IM OC 1:23, 2:50, 3:12, EH 4:80 and many other places for Rav Moshe’s view of mitzvot by heretics.
[3] Interested in the Rav's view on this? Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik recounted, in a response to a halacha l'ma'aseh question, in a public lecture at Yeshiva University on November 6, 1984, that a woman can -- without any hesitation -- recite kiddush even for a large group of people (men and women) in any circumstance, and that this was completely permissible (mutar le'chatchila), since no minyan is required for kiddush and therefore the group is not considered a tzibbur that need be concerned with its honor. This is consistent with my explanation above of the Rav's calculus: Mitzvot are different than non-mitzvot.
Parashah Roundup: Vayera 5770
by Steve BrizelAn Overview of the Parsha
Click here to read moreThe Way of God
Bikur Cholim
Avraham and Chesed
The Talmidim of Avraham Avinu
The Eshel Model of Kiruv
Lot and Avraham
Avraham's Prayers to Save Sdom
Tzedaka and Mishpat
The Birth of Yitzchak
Akedas Yitzchak
Zrizin Makdimin Lmitzvos
Announcements #119: Free Torah in Motion Classes and Halachically Speaking
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Free Torah in Motion ClassesSign up for free classes on Torah in Motion, beginning next week and continuing for eight weeks. I will be teaching one class (Tuesdays at 9pm). Registration is required: link
- Recovering Traditional Halakha: Non-Legalistic Law
Rabbi Elisha Ancselovits, Pardes Institute of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem; Yeshivat Maale Gilboa - Rare Books of Minhagim and Controversial Seforim
Rabbi Eliezer Brodt, Frequent contributor, Seforim blog - The Songs We Sing: A Fresh Look at the Psalms of Pesukei DeZimra, Kabbalat Shabbat, and Hallel
Rabbi Yitzchak Etshalom, Chair, Bible Department, YULA High School in Los Angeles - Eight Great Medieval Jewish Philosophers
Mrs. Daphna Fishman Secunda, Machon Maayan, Jerusalem; Stern College for Women, Yeshiva University - Forgeries & Censorship in Jewish Literature & Jewish Tradition
Mr. Dan Rabinowitz, Co-editor Seforim blog; Lawyer, Washington D.C. - The Talmud and its World
Dr. Shai Secunda, PhD in Talmud, Yeshiva University; Mandel fellow, Scholion Center for Interdisciplinary Jewish Research, Hebrew University - Twentieth Century Rabbinic Thinkers
Dr. Marc B. Shapiro, Weinberg Chair in Judaic Studies, University of Scranton; Extensive publications in the area of contemporary Orthodox Judaism - Science and Torah
Rabbi Natan Slifkin, Yeshivat Lev HaTorah, Ramat Bet Shemesh, Israel; Creator, Zoo Torah - Zoology and Torah
Rabbi Natan Slifkin, Yeshivat Lev HaTorah, Ramat Bet Shemesh, Israel; Creator, Zoo Torah - Recent Books You Should Care About
Rabbi Gil Student, Managing Editor, OU Press; Founder, Yashar Books; Creator, lead writer for award-winning Hirhurim blog - Philosophical Themes in Tanakh
Dr. Shira Weiss, Frisch School,Paramus, New Jersey; Stern College for Women, Yeshiva University
(Announce your simchah or Torah lectures by clicking on the
button in the top right corner of Hirhurim. See here for readership statistics and here for instructions on buying an announcement.)Wednesday, November 04, 2009
The Hard Reality of Women Orthodox Rabbis
I am in the middle of reading David Gelernter's eloquent new book, Judaism: A Way of Being. From what I understand, the core of this book is in a series of essays the author published in Commentary a few years ago.
One chapter addresses the following questions:
- Isn't normative or Orthodox Judaism inherently anti-woman, insofar as its public ceremonies are conducted by males?
- Assuming we reject the idea that women are in any way inferior, aren't we forced to make basic changes in Judaism?
Here is a relevant excerpt from Gelernter's book (pp. 109-111):
Still, the nonexistence of female rabbis in normative Judaism has unquestionably taken on (for some women) the force of tragedy. Judaism can sympathize but can't do anything about it: if you create woman rabbis, you not only break the law, you break the poetry. And law and poetry are all there is...
Times change. But people don't go to synagogue to study social trends... Those who long to keep religion up to date miss the point. Religious practices do change, but must be moved as slowly and gently as a brimful glass of wine. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai tells us in a midrash not to change our ancestors' customs, and cites: "Remove not the ancient boundary stones, which thy fathers have set up" (Proverbs 22:28). Rabbi Yohanan agrees, and cites a different verse: "Heed the discipline of your father, and do not forsake the teaching of your mother" (Proverbs 1:8).
The woman who yearns to be a rabbi resembles the openly practicing homosexual who wants the same thing. Both cases suggest a man who yearns to be a hazzan but lacks the ear or voice for it, or hopes to be a rosh yeshiva (the head of a yeshiva is an honored leader of the community ex officio) but lacks the temperament or brains, or wants to be a poet but has nothing to say. In none of these cases can Judaism wave a wand and make the obstacles disappear. Opportunities and limitations are innate in who you are; accepting that fact is one of the stiffest trials of growing up...
In the end, such issues have little to do with Judaism and much to do with character and personality. In Persuasion, Jane Austen describes a woman who had once been rich, married, and happy but is now, though still young, a poor and ailing widow. She ought to be miserable but isn't. She has been given every reason but has declined them all. "Here was that elasticity of mind, that disposition to be comforted, that power of turning readily from evil to good, and of finding employment which carried her out of herself, which was from Nature alone. It was the choicest gift of heaven."
Tuesday, November 03, 2009
The Avraham-Sarah Doublet
Readers of Genesis are confronted by a number of multiple passages, mainly doublets, that may strike them as being indicative of multiple sources with different accounts of the same stories that were redacted together. Two prominent examples are the Creation stories in Gen. 1 & 2 and the Flood stories in Gen. 6-9. (For a traditional view of the former, see R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith. On the latter, see my series of posts: I, II, III.)Click here to read moreThis is also the case with the stories about Avraham going to a strange place and having Sarah say that she is his sister, only to have her taken away by the local ruler. In Gen. 12 it is in Egypt and in Gen. 20 it is in Gerar. (In Gen. 26, a similar story is told about Yitzchak.) Early biblical critics used these as prime examples of clear cases where there are multiple sources. After all, Gen. 12 consistently refers to God with the Tetragrammaton while Gen. 20 uses the name Elokim (except for Gen. 20:18, which requires slicing that verse out of this passage). This should clinch the attribution of the passages to the J and E sources, respectively.
However, many scholars have come to realize that this is not a simple claim to uphold. In 1975, John Van Seters published a groundbreaking book called Abraham in History and Tradition. Van Seters argued against the at-the-time standard approach of dividing the Avraham narratives into mutually exclusive sources.
In particular, he argued that the story in Gen. 20 assumes familiarity with the story in Gen. 12. For example, Gen. 20:13 has Avraham telling Sarah to say that she is his sister. Why? Of what possible benefit can that be to either of them? Of course, we readers who are familiar with Gen. 12:11-13 know the answer.
And what was Avraham doing in Gerar that he had to answer about his wife's status? Gen. 20:13 indicates the God made Avraham wander, which is meaningless unless you are familiar with Gen. 12:1. (Van Seters also argues that Gen. 26 assumes knowledge of Gen. 20.)
There are other reasons to question the attribution of Gen. 20 to E. The two preceding chapters use the Tetragrammaton and therefore must, according to this approach, be part of J. However, there are clear thematic connections between Gen. 18-19 and Gen. 20 (cf. Victor Hamilton, New International Commentary on the Old Testament: Genesis, vol. 2 p. 58):
- Vulnerable female given over by family to strangers in order to protect a male - Lot turns over his daughters to the Sodomites in order to protect his guests (Gen. 19:18), and Abraham his wife to Avimelekh to protect himself (Gen. 20:2)
- God judges the wicked - Sodomites, Avimelekh and his compatriots
- God is accused of considering destroying innocent people (Gen. 20:4, 18:23)
- The role of the resident alien (Gen. 19:9, 20:1)
- Avraham's intercessions on behalf of others - Sodomites (Gen. 18:23-33), Avimelekh (Gen. 20:17).
Van Seters rejected the Documentary Hypothesis of mutually exclusive sources and instead proposed a series of progressive sources, each dependent on the prior. Later scholars have questioned this for a number of reasons, but most simply why Gen. 20's retelling of Gen. 12 is so different if it was written based on the first story.
Make no mistake: I am not claiming that the current state of biblical scholarship assumes a single biblical author. Later scholars have come up with even more complicated schemes to account for this undermining of the classical understanding of doublets. My point, however, is that the division of the Bible into multiple sources is not the smooth solution to glaring differences that it might appear to be. The traditional explanation -- that they are different stories and that 25 years after Avraham went to Egypt, he had a similar experience in Gerar -- is adequate and is as simple, if not more, than any attempt to divide the text into different sources. These doublets are certainly not convincing proof of different sources.
Thunder and Lightning
By: Rabbi Ari EnkinThe Talmud teaches that one should recite a blessing upon a number of different natural phenomena, including upon hearing thunder and seeing lightning. As the Mishna states: If one sees shooting stars, earthquakes, thunder, winds, or lightning, one recites the blessing "…shekocho u'gevurato maleh olam" (Blessed is He Whose might fills the world).[1] Interestingly, the Talmud concludes that one may recite either the blessing "…shekocho u'gevurato maleh olam" or the blessing "…oseh ma'aseh bereishit" (Blessed is He who performs the works of creation). The latter approach is codified by the Shulchan Aruch, who writes "on lightening and thunder one recites the blessing "…oseh ma'aseh bereishit" but one can recite "…shekocho u'gevurato maleh olam" instead, should one so desire.[2]
Click here to read moreThe Taz comments that common custom is to recite "…shekocho u'gevurato maleh olam" on thunder and "...oseh ma'aseh bereishit" on lightning.[3] He writes that he is unsure how this custom developed. He suggests that perhaps the noise of thunder is a stronger display of God's "might", considerably more so than a flash of lightning. Indeed, the halacha follows this view and one should recite "shekocho…" for thunder and "oseh…" for lightning.[4] However, one who sees lightning and hears thunder at the exact same time recites only one blessing, that of "oseh ma'aseh bereishit" or "shekocho u'gevurato maleh olam"[5], whichever one prefers.[6]
The blessings should be recited within "toch kdei dibbur" - within a few seconds of hearing the thunder or seeing the lightning. If one was unable to recite the blessing within this time frame, one must wait until their next appearance to do so.[7] The blessings are recited only one time per storm. In the event that a storm had completely cleared away and then returns later the same day, the blessing may be recited once more.[8] One is not required to see the actual lightning bolt in order to recite the blessing – it suffices to only see the flash produced by the lightning.[9]
In some communities there was a custom to omit God's name when reciting these blessings, and hence only "Baruch shekocho u'gevurato maleh olam" or "Baruch oseh ma'aseh bereishit" was recited.[10] Rabbi Chaim Pontrimoli of Izmir explains that the reason for this practice was based on the concern that people might not be aware of the requirement to recite the blessing within "toch kdei dibbur" of hearing thunder or seeing lightning, thereby rendering any blessing recited after this time as a beracha levatala – a blessing in vain.[11] Similarly, there was also a concern that those who were unfamiliar with the halachot of these blessings would recite them more than once per storm, thereby reciting multiple blessings in vain.[12] Therefore, in order to alleviate these fears, some authorities ruled that only the abbreviated form of these blessings should be recited. In this way, one would ultimately discharge the obligation of reciting the blessing and at the same time be free of any concerns that the blessing might be in vain if it was recited more than once or not quickly enough. Nevertheless, Rabbi Pontrimoli concludes by saying that those who are proficient in halacha should recite the blessing in its entirety. It may also just be that the custom of reciting the blessings in their abbreviated form was based on the view of the Raavad that any of the blessings mentioned in the ninth chapter of Masechet Berachot were intended to be recited without God's name.
There is a widespread misconception that one is not to recite the blessing on lightning until one hears thunder, as well.[13] According to this mistaken "custom", one then recites the two blessings one after the other. Not only is this practice wrong due to the delay incurred between seeing the lightning and reciting the blessing, but when one does recites the blessing on the lightning ("…oseh ma'aseh bereishit") it essentially covers the thunder as well, rendering the "shekocho…" blessing recited immediately thereafter a blessing in vain.[14] It may just be that this erroneous practice developed in order to ensure that the lightning that one saw is accompanied by rain and was not "heat lightning", upon which one is not to recite a blessing upon seeing.[15] In any event, if it is clear that the lightning one saw is a component of an upcoming storm the blessing should be recited without delay.
*********************************************************
[1] Berachot 54a
[2] O.C. 227:1
[3] Taz O.C. 227:1
[4] Mishna Berura 227:5
[5] Mishna Berura 227:5
[6] Aruch Hashulchan 227:2
[7] Mishna Berura 227:12
[8] Mishna Berura 227:8
[9] Tzitz Eliezer 12:21, Az Nidberu 6:23:2
[10] Ben Ish Chai;Ekev, cited at: http://www.dailyhalacha.com/Display.asp?ClipDate=4/12/2007
[11] Petach Hadevir 227:3, cited at: http://www.dailyhalacha.com/Display.asp?ClipDate=4/12/2007
[12] Petach Hadevir 227:3
[13] Discussed in Piskei Teshuvot 227:6
[14] Aruch Hashulchan O.C. 227:2
[15] Mishna Berura 227:3
Sunday, November 01, 2009
Waiting for the Lord
The most frequently mispronounced word in the haftarah was found in this past week's. Isaiah 40:31 contains the word "וקוי" which, according to Radak and Minchas Shai, should be pronounced "ve-koyei" but is often mispronounced as "ve-kovei," almost certainly because of the unusual construct.I was once in a synagogue where someone insisted to me that the reader had not mispronounced the word and the synagogue's custom was to pronounce it "ve-kovei." I once tried to justify this pronunciation to a prominent Brooklyn rabbi by pointing to the Gemara in Sanhedrin (92b) where the Vilna Shas has the word spelled "וקווי," which can only be pronounced "ve-kovei." The rabbi was not impressed, either because the final Mishnah in Kiddushin has it spelled properly or, more likely, because this at most shows that some unknown scribe along the way mispronounced and misspelled the word.
The right way: link (at 43 seconds)
The wrong way: link (look at the title of the song, unfortunately it is cut off from the clip)
Friday, October 30, 2009
Weekly Links
Rules: link (Note that this post will move every day until the end of the week)Friday
- SALT today: link
- Shootings at LA synagogue: link
- On the Leo Frank case: link
- Baltimore saves Jewish Times: link
- Response from Jewish Times: link
- Dr. Hayim Tawil publishes Akkadian lexicon: link
- Foreign language URLs to be allowed: link
- Brandeis professor studies marriage in the Russian shtetl: link
- A YCT student explains the (liberal) young American Jewish mindset: link
Previous days' linksThursday
- SALT today: link
- US State Dept. says Israel discriminates against non-Orthodox Judaism: link
- Distinguishing between depression and despair: link
- R. Avi Billet: The Very-Short-Marriage Crisis: link
- R. Tzvi Hersh Weinreb: On The Bimah Again: link
- Drop in Jewish web searches, rise in traffic to new sites: link
- Steinhardt warming up to God: link
- SALT today: link
- Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks becomes a lord: link
- LA multi-denominational rabbis unite: link
- Bronfman and Wertheimer debate assimilation: link
- SALT today: link
- Rav Elyashiv's rulings hit mainstream media: link
- Wikipedia striving for balance on divisive issues: link
- NYC Dept of Health issues poster to wash hands and recite the blessing after using the bathroom: link
- Ivanka Trump married Jared Kushner in an Orthodox ceremony: link
- More on UK Jewish schools accused of racism for only accepting Jewish students:
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Reb Yerucham and YU
In a recent post to the Seforim blog (link), Prof. Marc Shapiro describes how a letter to the journal Or Yisrael quotes R. Yerucham Gorelik's son as saying that his father never taught Gemara in Yeshiva University; he only taught Jewish thought (hashkafah):
אמנם זה עתה שמעתי מבנו של הגאון ר' ירוחם זצ"ל ה"ה ש"ב הגאון רבי מרדכי לייב גארעליק שליט"א שר' ירוחם גארעליק זצ"ל מעולם לא לימד שם גמרא כלל ואדרבה הי' סבירא לי' שאיסור חמור הוא ללמוד או ללמד גמרא בישיבה יוניברסיטה אפי' לשעה קלה ואפי' ע"מ להצילם, ועל אף שבידוע פעל רבי ירוחם זצ"ל רבות בכדי להציל את התלמידים דשם ולהוציא יקר מזולל, מ"מ לא עשה זאת ע"י שיעורים בגמרא אלא אך ורק ע"י שיעורים בהשקפה בלבד עכת"ד.This is blatantly false. While thousands of students can attest to this, there is a published record as well. In the book published to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the yeshiva that became YU, Sefer Yevul Ha-Yovelos, an essay was included from R. Gorelik that consisted of a student's notes about R. Gorelik's unique insights into the beginning of Bava Kama. How, one can ask, would a student have notes on Bava Kama if R. Gorelik did not teach Gemara in YU?
Click here to read moreThe brief bio of R. Gorelik and the essay from Yevul Ha-Yovelos is reproduced below: link to download PDF
Audio Roundup LXV
by Joel RichThe current issue of The Harvard Business review includes the following 3 approaches to “The New Landscape of Decision Making”.
| Method | Description | Benefits | Cautionary Message | Analytics | Using data and quantitative analysis to support decision making | Decisions are more likely to be correct. The scientific method adds rigor | Gathering enough data may be difficult and time-consuming Correct assumptions are crucial |
| Automation | Using decision rules and algorithms to automate decision processes | Speed and accuracy Criteria for decisions are clear | Difficult to develop Decision criteria may change |
| Intuition | Relying on one’s gut and experience to make decisions | Easy and requires no data The subconscious can be effective at weighing options | Typically the least accurate of decision approaches Decision makers are easily swayed by context |
Click here to read more
While I found the series so far to be a bit to canned, the philosophical issues raised are of great interest (coincidence that my Shabbat chaburah was studying the Chazon Ish’s (#69) responsum on deflecting an arrow to save 5 by killing 1 the week that the WS Journal printed a story on this series?) I’ve suggested to some “shiur channels” that they take this series and assemble halachic thought thereon. We’ll see if anyone takes on the challenge.
Requirement and meaning of bitachon. Parnassah related examples and that one should believe that one won’t be adversely affected by giving up certain profit related activity (e.g. not cheating in business). It’s a weltanschang which covers everything from choosing a profession (which isn’t all consuming) to making “reasonable” hishtadlut efforts (me - sounds like the Supreme Court’s definition of pornography?)
Question – why wasn’t the transition to paid rabbinical positions considered a lack of bitachon?
Not a lot of Q’s for an hour:
1. teaching torah – to non bnai brit, to women – what’s relevant (long discussion)
2. YU’s role in Israel. How, if at all, it should enter; a lot will depend on who would lead.
R’YBS wasn’t “interested” in EY (IIUC as far as being involved in “local” decisions?) – Centrality of EY wasn’t recognized.
Generally supportive of YU but some parts/people not consistent with what he’d want and some internal fixing needed.
Some in OJ don’t think integration/TUM/secular studies have any value, others think the price isn’t worth the pain. Even some of those who see some value don’t think should be under same roof (R’Hutner – let them study with me full time for 6 years, then study science [me – very practical solution for the masses The proof would be in the pudding, but of course no one does any formal surveys. That being said, my anecdotal experience is that it is much harder to stay the course outside of YU than inside. Of course, it's possible those who do are stronger for it and everyone makes their own decisions. For the group as a whole, I'd go with YU as having the better outcome.]).
3. No bechira chofshit other than for man (Breishit aside – the trees making decisions is a mystical thing). How do we understand HKB”H “changing his mind”? Better to have a good question than a bad answer. R’AL opts towards HKB”H having flexibility for change.
A classic R’HS shiur filled with lots of goodies like minimum shiur for bikkur cholim is 3.6 (halachic?) minutes.
Goal is to do the maximum you can to help the person get better – so in addition to helping to the extent you can (including putting them in a good mood), you must pray for them. [me - Does this include mumbling [the gabbai (or you)] the person’s name?] The Netziv in his commentary on the Shiltot says you can only offer a prayer in shmoneh esrai or tehillim (not a misheberach!) [me – mpi hashmuah R’YBS held this way; no wonder I resonate to his wavelength].
Most mitzvot between man and man are covered under Vahvta lreacha kamocha (love your neighbor as you love yourself) and thus subject to reciprocity [thus no coverage for non-bnaibrit. However there is a torah commandment of imitato dei which does cover our relationship with them!] [Hmmmm!]
Putting oneself into Safek (doubtful) danger to save one in definite danger – Must, May or Can’t? R’Chaim says must.
Talmud Nedarim – Tosfos there is weak!
Can you pray for someone to die? Yes, depending on the situation.
Bit of discussion of when prayer must be in Hebrew and what it means that angels don’t understand Aramaic (don’t ask me what it means).
Interesting history of nicht on shabbos geret.
When can or can’t an individual refuse treatment? Extremes are obvious, tripwires not so clear.
Very detailed review (first in a series)of various types of physical areas for purposes of carrying (or not) and building eruvim.
Interesting (to an actuary) point that R’Moshe ball parked an estimate of what % of people who live in an area would actually be on the street at any one time. I’d love to know what data was examined or experts consulted.
First in a series of a very detailed review of basic kashrut issues; Here includes bittul, rov, ein mvatlin issur lchatchila, davar sheyesh lo mattirin.
Of course, kdarko bkodesh, many opinions quoted.
Interesting discussion about safek drabbanan l’kula and when to ignore (i.e. be strict anyway)
Psychological explanation of why the mitzvah is for men and why it needs to be a
mitzvah.
Hostage issue. Halacha and Hashkafa – it’s not a simple question.
The usual suspects – including davening mincha and maariv in the same halachic time period, are you really turning Friday afternoon into Shabbat or just accepting some restrictions earlier on Friday.
Mussar – Be a mentch in the airport (and everywhere else).
Talmudic sources of different types of Onaat dvarim – some specifics and exceptions (to be continued).
Sometimes beauty matters (see hilchot aveilut for women, “competencies" for Kohain Gadol [this bears further discussion]). Deal with possible issue of self wounding as long as “reasonable” risk.
Beginning of a series on interpretation of Medrashim. Here Avraham/Lech Lcha and leaving an old life behind, asking questions and the burning/lit up house medrash.
Balancing professional confidence (HIPPAA?)/privileged information and when it can/must be broken from an halachic standpoint. What is the source (lo telech rachil?) and what is the counter (Hashavat Aveidah, Lo Taamod)? Shut Tzitz Eliezer on the general issue and child abuse in particular.
R’YBS – Hamakom is used (e.g. hamakom yinachem) when we feel distanced from HKB”H. R’X adds it may refer to the bet hamikdash.
Why did Rashi move away from the standard medrash approach which preceded him to a more pshat basis? Perhaps due to the disputations with non-bnai brit in Europe. In sfard they were more scientific and thus more prone to a pshat approach. Rashbam was very critical of Rashi as pshat; but Rashi was an important transition.
Discussion of various opinions on what exactly is tfila btzibur and tfilat hatzibbur. Rambam as source of practices, opinions of R’M Feinstein and R’YBS. Some practical differences.
Answering the age old question – who jumps off the ski lift (if anyone) if you’re “stuck” in a yichud situation. Is it a Torah or rabbinic prohibition? Is it Yehareg V’al Yaavor?
Beginning of series – Here biography and major works; begin discussion of principles of faith (paging Dr. Shapiro!)
Beginning of a series of sh”ut and the historic and geographic context. Here R’Kook and his love of Eretz Yisrael.
A question to the meil tzedakah – can you pray for someone to repent; is this a prayer to remove free will? Various Talmudic stories brought as proofs. Bottom line yes but better not (my general question – what does it mean that HKB”H prefers but doesn’t demand?). R’Klapper sees this as an example of letting halacha operate within his philosophical context (don’t really want to take away free will).
